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8. Round Kant or Through Him? On James’s Arguments for Freedom, and their 
Relation to Kant’s  
Robert Stern 
 
 
My title is a reference to a famous remark that James makes about Kant: 
 
I believe that Kant bequeathes to us not one single conception which is both indispensable to 
philosophy and which philosophy either did not possess before him, or was not destined inevitably 
to acquire after him through the growth of men’s reflection upon the hypotheses by which science 
interprets nature. The true line of philosophic progress lies, in short, it seems to me, not so much 
through Kant as round him to the point where now we stand. (WWJ 5:139)
1
 
 
This comes at the end of his 1904 essay “The Pragmatic Method,” where he is arguing that 
Kant’s critical philosophy is not really much of an advance on the approach of the “English-
speaking philosophers,” who he sees as the ancestors of pragmatism insofar as they “introduced 
the custom of interpreting the meaning of conceptions by asking what difference they make for 
life.”  “Thus,” James claims, “when all is said and done, it was they, not Kant, who introduced 
‘the critical method’ into philosophy, the one method fitted to make philosophy a study worthy of 
serious men. For what seriousness can possibly remain in debating philosophic propositions that 
will never make an appreciable difference to us in action? And what matters it, when all 
propositions are practically meaningless, which of them be called true or false?” Given this 
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situation, James concludes that “Philosophy can perfectly well outflank [Kant], and build herself 
up into adequate fullness by prolonging more directly the older English lines” – although he 
allows that “connoisseurs” will always be drawn back to exploring the “wondrous and racy 
contents” that make up the “antique bric-a-brac museum” that is Kant’s mind (WWJ 5:138-9). 
But does this present a fair picture of James’s attitude to Kant, and of his indebtedness to 
him? Is it right to see James (and on James’s view, pragmatism itself) as nothing but an extension 
of the “older English lines” of thought, to which Kant is at best nothing more than an optional 
and perhaps diverting detour? These are large questions, which have already received a fair 
amount of discussion.
2
 But here I want to take a somewhat narrower focus, and consider in 
particular James’s arguments for freedom,3 particularly those offered in his essay “The Dilemma 
of Determinism” (1897). 
While on some readings of both Kant’s idealism and James’s pragmatism which will be 
discussed below, it may indeed seem that each must be committed to radically different 
arguments for freedom, I will argue that this essay shows their approaches to be very close, 
which perhaps suggests that their fundamental philosophical views are not so far apart after all – 
and that without some influence on him of a Kantian outlook, James could not have got to his 
final destination, suggesting that Kant is perhaps no mere detour after all. 
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 In speaking about “freedom” in this context, two cautionary remarks are needed. First, as James makes clear at the 
start of the article in question, he takes himself not to be arguing for freedom, but rather indeterminism – because he 
thinks the term freedom has been co-opted by the kind of “soft determinism” that he takes to be incoherent and so 
abhors, and he therefore says he will eschew the term: “The word ‘chance’ I wish to keep, but I wish to get rid of the 
word ‘freedom.’ Its eulogistic associations have so far overshadowed all the rest of its meaning that both parties 
claim sole right to use it, and determinists to-day insist that they alone are freedom’s champions… Now all this is a 
quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered… [The issue of fact] is the 
question of determinism, about which we are to talk to-night” (WWJ 6:117). At the risk of some confusion, however, 
I will talk about freedom as much as indeterminism, so it should be borne in mind that when it comes to James, it is 
freedom in this latter sense that is at issue. The second point to note here is that of course this does not necessarily 
correspond exactly to what Kant means in speaking about freedom and (especially) autonomy, so that the 
conclusions of the two thinkers using the arguments we will consider are not necessarily to be equated. But since my 
main aim is to focus on the strategy they both employ, not the validity of these arguments as such, I will also largely 
set this complication to one side. 
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My strategy will be to present two rather contrasting ways of understanding the way in 
which James as a pragmatist and Kant as an idealist seem to approach the problem of freedom, 
and then to argue that as we refine their respective positions, James and Kant can be brought 
closer and closer together, and in a way that shows there to be a fundamental Kantian aspect to 
James’s thinking on this issue, in a way that I hope does credit to them both. 
 
1. Pragmatism and Idealism on Freedom: A First Pass 
One way to approach James’s account of freedom in “The Dilemma of Determinism” is in the 
light of “The Will to Believe,” which was published in the same year, where that latter essay has 
been seen as defending a characteristically Jamesian attitude to matters of belief, justification and 
evidence. 
The interpretation of that paper is of course disputed, but on one account James can be 
read as claiming “that it is foolish not to believe, or try to believe, if one is happier for believing” 
(Letter from Chauncey Wright; cited in Misak 1993, 63), or slightly more moderately that “one 
has a right to believe ahead of the evidence, if one is happier for believing” (Misak 2011, 262). 
This way of understanding James’s view seems to have been the one that Peirce adopted when he 
characterizes a religious believer as saying: “Oh, I could not believe so-and-so, because I would 
be wretched if I did”; and then rejected it with the scornful remark: “When an ostrich buries its 
head in the sand as danger approaches, it very likely takes the happiest course” (“The Fixation of 
Belief” [1877], Peirce 1931-58, vol. 5, § 377; cited by Misak 2013, 64).4 So, as Cheryl Misak 
summarizes this approach (which she seems to favor as the correct reading of James): “James 
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 This cannot be taken as Peirce’s response to “The Will to Believe” itself, as it appears almost two decades before 
James gave his lecture in 1896; but James espouses similar views in earlier publications, while as Misak makes clear, 
Wright and James had been disputing the issue from 1875, where the dispute was well known to people in their 
circle, including Peirce.  
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wants to expand the concept of evidence…to include as evidence the satisfaction of the believer” 
(Misak 2013: 63) – where to most evidentialists (including Misak, it appears),5 this “expansion” 
is enough to take James out of the evidentialist camp altogether, where this is then said to be 
James’s aim, and so to lie at the heart of his dispute with Clifford, amongst others.6 
If this is seen as James’s approach in “The Will to Believe,” this then might suggest the 
following underlying argument for freedom in “The Dilemma of Determinism”: In this essay, 
James argues that unless we reject determinism, we will be left with a thoroughly pessimistic 
view of reality, as we cannot intelligibly regret the bad features of the world, and think they may 
not be intrinsic to it, as “[o]ther things being what they are, it could not be different” (WWJ 
6:126). James might therefore be read as taking the gloomy implications of determinism as 
sufficient grounds on which to reject it, in line with this interpretation of “The Will to Believe.” 
This, if it were the correct way to make sense of him, would then give us a distinctively 
pragmatist defense of freedom, which would seem to have little corresponding to it on the idealist 
side. 
Likewise, one could understand Kant’s defense of freedom in an idealist manner that 
would have little echo in pragmatism. On this approach, Kant could be read as claiming on 
transcendental grounds that we have no option but to believe that we are free, perhaps because it 
cannot be doubted from the perspective of an agent, where this then brings in considerations in 
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 Cf. Misak 2013, 67: “We have seen that one way of thinking of James’s view has it being compatible with 
evidentialism – with the view that one should believe in accord with one’s evidence. But he has a view of evidence 
that is anathema to the evidentialist.” Cf. also Misak 2013, 63: “[O]ne of the ways in which James wants to expand 
the concept of evidence is to include as evidence the satisfaction of the believer. This is something the evidentialist 
will be loathe to accept. He will argue that the evidence for the truth of a belief cannot come in the form of the belief 
making me happy, or you comfortable.” Cf. Principles of Psychology, volume I, WWJ 8:322: “The reader who finds 
any comfort in the idea of the Soul is, however, perfectly free to continue to believe in it; for our reasonings have not 
established the non-existence of the Soul; they have only proved its superfluity for scientific purposes.”  
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 Cf. “The Sentiment of Rationality,” WWJ 6:80: “Our reasons are ludicrously incommensurate with the volume of 
our feeling, yet on the latter we unhesitatingly act… [B]elief (as measured by action) not only does and must 
continually outstrip scientific evidence…” 
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support of freedom that have nothing to do with the effects of this belief on our happiness or 
well-being. Here, then, we would have an idealist argument for freedom, which in turn would 
seem to have little resemblance to a pragmatist approach as outlined above. 
If these readings of James and Kant respectively are accepted, therefore, it would seem 
that there is little common ground between the two of them on this issue. However, it seems to 
me that both these readings would fail to capture properly their respective positions, where with 
further refinements they can be brought closer together. 
 
2. Pragmatism and Idealism on Freedom: Further Refinements 
A first refinement we can make to James’s view is to question whether he really thought the best 
defense of freedom was that believing in it would increase our satisfaction by making pessimism 
less likely. For, even when it comes to “The Will to Believe” itself, it is by no means clear that 
this is his general account of justification for belief.  For, of course, James places significant 
limits to the kinds of cases to which he thinks his approach should be applied:
7
 namely when the 
options in question are living, forced, and momentous, and where the question cannot be decided 
on “intellectual grounds” (“The Will to Believe,” WWJ 6:20). In such circumstances, James can 
be read as arguing, we are not required to sit and wait for conclusive evidence to come in, as we 
do not have this luxury, while such proof is rarely if ever available anyway; instead he thinks we 
are entitled to adopt the belief in question, where if we did not, we would be sure to lose the 
“goods” that accepting it would bring. 
Thus, in the religious case, he holds that we cannot ever get into a position of knowing for 
sure if God exists or does not; and on this basis, James can be taken to argue that it is therefore 
                                                        
7
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not necessary for us to wait for such evidence to be available, but instead we can believe in God 
based on the benefits to us that accepting such belief will entail: 
 
When I look at the religious question as it really puts itself to concrete men, and when I think of 
all the possibilities which both practically and theoretically it involves, then this command that we 
shall put a stopper on our heart, instincts and courage, and wait – acting of course meanwhile 
more or less as if religion were not true – till doomsday, or till such time as our intellect and sense 
working together may have raked in evidence enough – this command, I say, seems to me the 
queerest idol ever manufactured in the philosophic cave. (WWJ 6:177) 
 
Like the earlier view, this is still a form of anti-evidentialism, but a more moderate kind than 
previously, as it is allowing that we can believe p on non-epistemic grounds only in cases where 
conclusive evidence is hard or not possible to attain – but where James’s fallibilism concerning 
human knowledge means that in practice this will be most of the time. James’s justification for 
the view seems to be that on many occasions we must act if we are not to lose the good in 
question altogether,
8
 where then waiting for further evidence in our epistemic condition is not a 
rational option to pursue, even at the risk of possible error. 
We may then think of this more moderate anti-evidentialism in relation to an argument for 
freedom, where we could take James to be arguing in the following way: There is no compelling 
evidence for or against determinism, and it is unlikely that there can even be any, while belief in 
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freedom also meets the conditions of being live, forced and momentous, and where rejecting this 
belief would lead to a pessimistic and life-sapping world view: 
 
[The principle of causality] is as much an altar to an unknown god as the one that Saint Paul found 
at Athens. All our scientific and philosophic ideals are altars to unknown gods. Uniformity is as 
much so as is free-will. If this be admitted, we can debate on even terms. (WWJ 6:116) 
Now, evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism is, as I 
intimated a while back, strictly impossible to find. (WWJ 6:117) 
 
This way of taking James’s position may then take us closer to a wide-spread way of reading 
Kant, and his emphasis on “the primacy of practical reason,” which can be understood in the 
following terms: Theoretical reason must leave certain questions undecided, because of the 
limitations of human understanding, where at this point we are entitled to believe claims about 
the world on practical grounds instead, i.e. on the grounds that these beliefs are required if we are 
to act in certain ways and not others, where we take it that such actions bring with them certain 
“goods,” such as more knowledge of the world (as in the case of regulative ideas) or the greater 
likelihood of moral action (as in the postulates).
9
  
So we now appear to have brought James and Kant closer together: On the first way of 
taking the positions of James and Kant, as based on extreme non-evidentialism and on a 
transcendental claim respectively, they looked very different. But now they look more 
convergent, as two forms of what has been called “practical non-evidentialism.”10 
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 Cf. CWJ 8:275: “Adopt your hypothesis, and see how it agrees with life – That is faith. As Kant says I have swept 
away knowledge in order to make room for Faith; and that seems to me the absolutely sound and healthy position.” 
10
 Chignell 2013, §6.1. Cf. also Chignell 2007, 323-60, 354-7, and 335, where Chignell comments that the 
“antievidentialist flavor [of Kant’s project] anticipates strands of later pragmatism.” 
  8 
Of course, this doesn’t mean they are exactly the same: In particular, their arguments for 
the claim regarding the impotence of theoretical reason are different: For James in “The Will to 
Believe” it is mainly a general appeal to fallibilism and the role of hypotheses in inquiry,11 while 
in “The Dilemma of Determinism” it is more like a claim about theoretical underdetermination: 
at the highest level, when we are dealing with fundamental world-views, there just cannot be any 
“objective” or “external” evidence to settle the choice between them: 
 
[F]acts practically have hardly anything to do with making us either determinists or 
indeterminists. Sure enough, we make a flourish of quoting facts this way or that… But who does 
not see the wretched insufficiency of this so-called objective testimony on both sides? What fills 
up the gaps in our minds is something not objective, not external. What divides us into possibility 
men and anti-possibility men is different faiths or postulates – postulates of rationality. To this 
man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it – to that man more rational with 
possibilities excluded; and talk as we will about having to yield to evidence, what makes us 
monists or pluralists, determinists or indeterminists, is at bottom always some sentiment like this. 
(WWJ 6:119) 
 
For James, when it comes to these fundamental philosophical choices, “hard evidence” will never 
settle the issue, which then opens up the space for a different approach.
12
 But for Kant, it is the 
structure of transcendental idealism that opens up this space, with his claims about the limits of 
our capacity to fully grasp the nature of “things as they are in themselves” – given which 
theoretical reason has inevitable limits. 
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Nonetheless, notwithstanding this significant difference, it still may now seem that James 
and Kant are broadly similar in the strategy they adopt for the defense of our belief in freedom. 
 
3. Pragmatism and Idealism on Freedom: Another Step 
However, I now want to suggest that this approach to Kant’s position on freedom, while pretty 
widespread and familiar,
13
 is mistaken, and that Kant is much closer to an evidentialist position 
on this matter than this assumes – where then (if I am right in my account of Kant) the question 
arises whether James is an evidentialist concerning freedom too, or whether in the end they 
remain apart on this issue because he takes the non-evidentialist option where Kant does not. Let 
me begin by giving my reasons for thinking that Kant is a particular kind of evidentialist in his 
argument for freedom. I will here focus on Kant’s discussion in the Critique of Practical Reason: 
as will be considered in §4, problems with my reading may make it necessary to bring in other 
discussions, which will therefore be dealt with there. 
Kant’s argument in the Critique of Practical Reason centers on the example of a man who 
is asked to give false testimony, on pain of immediate execution. Kant argues that the man will be 
conscious that he ought to overcome his love of life, and refuse to give false witness; but because 
ought implies can, he must also hold that he is free to act in this way, even if in fact he might not 
do so because he could be tempted to do other than he ought to do: 
 
He would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would do it or not, but he must admit without 
hesitation that it would be possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something 
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unrestricted validity of the principle that rational belief requires evidence in favour of its truth. Rather, we can be 
rationally warranted in a belief even in the complete absence of evidence for it.” Willaschek draws a parallel between 
Kant and James on these issues on pp. 194-6. 
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because he is aware [bewußt] that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, 
without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him. (5:30)
14
 
 
Kant takes this example to confirm that “morality first discloses to us the concept of freedom” 
(KGS 5:30), rather than the other way round, and so is the “ratio cognoscendi of freedom” (KGS 
5:4n): “For had not the moral law already been distinctly thought in our reason, we should never 
consider ourselves justified in assuming such as thing as freedom (even though it is not self-
contradictory). But were there no freedom, the moral law would not be encountered at all in 
ourselves” (KGS 5:4n). This then gives the moral law the status of a “fact of reason” for Kant: 
 
Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it 
out from antecedent data of reason, for example, from consciousness of freedom (since this is not 
antecedently given to us) and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori 
proposition that is not based on any intuition… (KGS 5:31) 
 
The question I want to raise, then, is how far this argument should be seen as offering a non-
evidentialist argument for freedom? 
My claim is that it is in fact perfectly evidentialist; all that may make it seem otherwise is 
that the evidence in question comes not from what theoretical reason tells us, but rather from 
what practical reason tells us instead. In this sense, then, practical reason has priority over 
theoretical reason: namely, that the evidence we need comes from the former and not the latter – 
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but not in the sense that we are moving from evidential theoretical reason to non-evidential 
practical reason, as on the approach outlined previously.  
The basis for this claim is the role that the awareness of the moral “ought” plays in Kant’s 
argument, either in the individual case (“I ought to overcome my love of life and not give false 
witness”) or more generally (“I ought to follow the moral law in universalizing my maxims”): 
Here, I would suggest, Kant is using such awareness to ground the claim that we are free, insofar 
as ultra posse nemo obligatur (no one is obliged to do what it is impossible for them to do, or (in 
this sense) “ought implies can”), so that the former is then adequate evidence for the latter. This 
would therefore seem to fit an evidentialist approach, except that the evidence does not come 
from what theoretical reason tells us about the workings of the empirical world, but from what 
practical reason tells us about how we should act. 
It could be argued, however, that while this “fact of reason” discussion might be 
understood in an evidentialist manner, Kant’s later treatment of freedom as a postulate in the 
Critique suggests a less evidentialist approach, particularly when Kant says of such postulates 
that “this is the only case in which my interest, because I may not give up anything of it, 
unavoidably determines my judgment” (KGS 5:143).15 Indeed, it might seem that it exactly such 
non-evidentialism that prompts Kant to deal with the worry raised by Thomas Wizenmann, that 
the need for p entitles one to postulate the existence of p, where this is also the sort of worry that 
was frequently raised against James. 
Now, much could be said on this topic, but just to mention some relevant points. First, in 
response to Wizenmann’s objection, Kant in fact argues in an evidentialist manner, again 
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appealing to the principle of “ought implies can”: “It is a duty to realize the highest good to the 
utmost of our capacity; therefore it must be possible; hence it is also unavoidable for every 
rational being in the world to assume what is necessary for its objective possibility” (KGS 
5:143n). Kant would appear to be arguing that to make sense of this duty, one must grant its 
necessary conditions, such that the former provides ground for belief in the latter, in contrast to 
the Wizenmann case of an inclination, where one can of course have a need based on an 
inclination, without the latter providing any basis for thinking that what makes the inclination 
satisfiable in fact obtains, as it is not the case that “want implies can.” It might be replied, 
however, that even if this is so, what the evidence supports here is still not a belief, but something 
more like a hope, or supposition, or assumption.
16
 However, my response to this challenge would 
be to say that this is not grounds for doubting Kant’s earlier evidentialist argument, but more 
reflects the fact that here the discussion has shifted to freedom as a postulate in relation to the 
highest good, rather than in relation to the fact of reason. For, the highest good is an object or 
goal we are obliged to aim to bring about, where what we are assuming are the conditions that 
make this object or goal rational to aim for, where something weaker than a belief might suffice; 
but in the “fact of reason” case, we are deriving the conditions that explain or make possible the 
moral law as such, as it is actually applicable to us, where something stronger would seem to be 
required.
17
 This then also explains the clear priority Kant gives to freedom over the other 
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postulates, and why he gives it a more substantial epistemic status, which then (I would suggest) 
calls for a more evidentialist approach than for the postulates of God and immortality.
18
 
Nonetheless, Kant’s argument as I understand it does still share an important similarity 
with the non-evidential approach outlined previously, which is that he needs to “neutralize” the 
claim of theoretical reason to be able to prove conclusively that we in fact lack freedom – for if 
this could be established, the argument above could be turned on its head, to show that as we are 
unfree, we are unable to act morally and so do not fall under the jurisdiction of the moral law.  
But, the machinery of transcendental idealism ensures for Kant that no such claim of theoretical 
reason can ever be plausibly established: From the perspective of theoretical reason on its own, it 
must always remain an open question about whether we are free or not, where then the evidence 
from practical reason can then be used to tip the epistemic balance in favor of this belief. 
 It is perhaps also worth noting, that while it may be right to claim that the Groundwork 
differs from the second Critique on these issues, so that it might be said that there is a “great 
reversal” between the two texts (Cf. Critique of Practical Reason, KGS 5:46-8), it is nonetheless 
the case that in the Groundwork there are also suggestions of the kind of argument he will offer 
in the later work. I would claim that an argument of this sort can be found towards the end of the 
third section, for example in the following passage:  
 
All human beings think of themselves as having a will that is free. From this stems all judgments 
about actions such that they ought to have been done even if they were not done… [R]eason for 
speculative purposes finds the route of natural necessity much more even and useful than that of 
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the moral law.” 
  14 
freedom: yet for practical purposes the footpath of freedom is the only one on which it is possible 
to make use of one’s reason in our behaviour; which is why it is just as impossible for the subtlest 
philosophy as for the commonest human reason to rationalize freedom away. (KGS 4:455-6) 
 
Kant’s position here can be understood as follows: While theoretical reason finds it compelling to 
view the world in terms of natural necessity, we also possess practical reason, which tells us how 
we ought to act in various ways. But we could not take this practical reason seriously unless we 
took ourselves to be free, as it is only insofar as we are free that the “ought” could apply to us.19 
Thus, given the practical as well as theoretical nature of our reason, in telling us that there are 
things we ought to do, we are entitled to believe that we possess the freedom that such oughts 
require.
20
 And this argument, far from being at odds with Kant’s approach in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, is entirely consistent with it: for of course one of the things practical reason 
tells us according to Kant, is what we ought to do as moral agents, so that this then becomes the 
ratio cognoscendi of our freedom. 
We have seen, therefore, how it is possible to read Kant’s final position as involving an 
evidentialism concerning our freedom, but where that evidentialism takes a practical form, based 
on the way in which practical reason tells us that there are ways in which we ought to act. Kant 
allows, of course, that if theoretical reason could establish that we lack freedom, then we should 
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way in which reason]…first becomes aware that by itself it can also be practical….” 
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reject the “ought” as it applies to us as illusory or a “chimera” (cf. KGS 4:445); but given that 
this is not possible, because of the limitations imposed on theoretical reason by the very structure 
of transcendental idealism, we are entitled to take that evidence at face value, and so come to 
accept that we are free. Thus, the “primacy of practical reason” here does not mean that it 
becomes some sui generis source of belief that is not properly epistemic, but rather that it extends 
the possibility of our rational beliefs (if not certainty) beyond the boundaries of theoretical 
reason, while at the same time respecting the jurisdiction of the latter. 
 
However, if this is the right approach to take with respect to Kant, does this then put him at odds 
with James? Does James’s pragmatism commit him to a more thoroughgoing anti-evidentialism 
which is now no longer apparent in Kant’s strategy as interpreted above? I don’t see why this 
should follow, for it seems to me that James’s strategy could also be taken along evidentialist 
lines, without stretching the concept of evidence to breaking-point, as Misak fears. To see why, it 
may be worth saying a little bit more about the actual structure of “The Dilemma of 
Determinism” essay than we have done up to now. 
James starts by making clear the limits of what he is trying to do, which is that he cannot 
offer any conclusive proof of our freedom, but that he can give grounds for taking it to be true, 
and acting on that basis: 
 
I thus disclaim openly on the threshold all pretension to prove to you that the freedom of the will 
is true. The most I hope is to induce some of you to follow my example in assuming it true, and 
acting as if it were true. (WWJ 6:115) 
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And James famously remarks that this is how it ought to be: we don’t want to be compelled into 
believing freedom with a “coercive demonstration,” but to freely make our choice based on the 
evidence (WWJ 6:115).
21
 
He also makes a further important preliminary point: That in general, we make and are 
entitled to make theory choices based on which gives us the greater “subjective satisfaction,” but 
where this means “makes the world appear more rational”: 
 
The arguments I am about to urge all proceed on two suppositions: first, when we make theories 
about the world and discuss them with one another, we do so in order to attain a conception of 
things which will give us subjective satisfaction; and, second, if there be two conceptions, and the 
one seems to us, on the whole, more rational than the other, we are entitled to suppose that the 
more rational one is the truer of the two. (WWJ 6:115) 
 
What is the justification for this approach? It seems to have worked, as a way of finding out about 
the world: 
 
I cannot stop to argue the point; but I myself believe that all the magnificent achievements of 
mathematical and physical science – our doctrines of evolution, of uniformity of law, and the rest 
– proceed from our indomitable desire to cast the world into a more rational shape in our minds 
than the shape into which it is thrown there by the crude order of our experience. The world has 
                                                        
21
 The fact that James talks here of “assuming” freedom to be true, and “acting as if it were true” might suggest that 
James is arguing for a weaker cognitive status for freedom, by treating it as an assumption, a postulate, a regulative 
idea or a Peircean “hope,” as against belief as such – where then to attain this weaker status, various sorts of non-
evidentialism may become more plausible. However, unlike Peirce and Kant, James seems to have been less keen to 
draw this kind of contrast, where of course it is belief that forms the focus of “The Will to Believe,” so it is not so 
clear that this kind of non-evidentialist route is an option for James here, even if it might have made his position less 
controversial, like Peirce’s. 
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shown itself, to a great extent, plastic to this demand of ours for rationality. How much farther it 
will show itself plastic no one can say. Our only means of finding out is to try… (WWJ 6:115)22 
 
This passage can already be said to have a clear Kantian aspect, in claiming that we must go 
beyond the data of raw experience to bring an order to it and thus our encounter with the world. 
But the passage also has a less Kantian aspect: (a) there is no suggestion that this 
somehow imposes on the world an order it doesn’t possess in itself, even though that structure 
may not be immediately apparent in “the crude order of our experience,”23 (b) there is no 
guarantee that the ordering cannot meet with resistance from the world at some point, but no 
reason to think it has done so up to now (so no call for skepticism), and so no reason to hold back 
in our inquiries. In fact, James’s position here is perhaps most reminiscent of Hegel’s famous 
claim that: “To him who looks at the world rationally the world looks rationally back; the two 
exist in a reciprocal relationship” (Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Hegel 1969-71, vol. 12, 
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 Cf. James’s remark in the Preface to the collection in which this essay appears: “Postulating more unity than the 
first experiences yield, we also discover more” (WWJ 6:6). 
23
 Cf. also Pragmatism, WWJ 1:117: “All our truths are beliefs about ‘Reality’; and in any particular belief the 
reality acts as something independent, as a thing found, not manufactured.” But for a different contemporary view of 
“the pragmatic method of explanation” and thus perhaps of someone like James, cf. Kemp Smith 1920, 10-11: “Even 
science, it was contended, is not a form of theoretical insight; it is merely a means to power. Science, rightly 
understood, never seeks to explain, but only to simplify. By scrupulously careful observation we verify the ultimate 
coexistences and sequences among our sensations, and under the guidance of elaborate hypotheses, which have a 
merely subjective value in directing inquiry, we define the coexistences and sequences in exact qualitative terms. 
Acquaintance with these relations, when thus precisely defined, enables us to predict the future, to construct 
machines, and so progressively to gain control over our physical environment; but they yield no insight, it is 
maintained, into the independently real. What is alone truly characteristic of science is not the obtaining of insight, 
but the acquisition of power. Thought is an instrument developed through natural processes for the practical purposes 
of adaptation. Its criteria and values are exclusively determined by the instinctive equipment of the species in its 
adjustment to environment. They have no independent validity of any kind. The human mind, the argument 
proceeds, is limited to appearances; to attain knowledge in the absolute sense, that is to say through distinguishing 
between the true and the false, is impossible.” Cf. also p. 14, where Kemp Smith contrast “present-day naturalism” 
(where he mentions J. S. Mill and Huxley) which aims to be more realist, with “the skeptical, subjectivist, pragmatic 
view of knowledge.” 
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23. Trans. in Hegel 1975, 29; translation modified)– but of course James thinks Hegel’s 
conception of reason ultimately takes him in a monistic direction, which he deplores.
24
 
James makes clear at the outset that he includes moral issues within the material that we 
need to taken into account when we “cast the world into a more rational shape”: 
 
Our only means of finding out is to try; and I, for one, feel as free to try conceptions of moral as of 
mechanical or of logical rationality. If a certain formula for expressing the nature of the world 
violates my moral demand, I shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it 
disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, for example; the one demand being, so far as 
I can see, quite as subjective and emotional as the other is. (WWJ 6:115-6)
25
 
 
Now, this may be taken as a form of coherentist evidentialism:
26
 We should try to generate as 
coherent a system of beliefs as we can, where a test for belief is whether rejecting it would 
undermine that system – and where it may turn out that rejecting a moral demand may cause as 
much damage as anything else, which can then be grounds on which to keep it, ceteris paribus.
27
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 Cf. James, A Pluralistic Universe, where James writes approvingly that “‘The aim of knowledge,’ says Hegel, ‘is 
to divest the objective world of its strangeness, and to make us more at home in it’” (WWJ 4:10), but argues that 
ultimately Hegel’s monistic tendencies makes this impossible, at least as evidenced by the British idealists: “Albeit 
the absolute is defined as being necessarily an embodiment of objectively perfect rationality, it is fair to its english 
advocates to say that those who have espoused the hypothesis most concretely and seriously have usually avowed the 
irrationality to their own minds of certain elements of it” (WWJ 4:55).  
25
 Cf. “The Sentiment of Rationality,” WWJ 6:76: “That nature will follow to-morrow the same laws that she follows 
to-day is, they [i.e. ‘the scientific philosophers of the present day’] all admit, a truth which no man can know; but in 
the interests of cognition as well as of action we must postulate or assume it.”  
26
 Reading James this way gives him a response to the criticism of J. B. Pratt (cited by Misak 2011, 264), that James 
confuses “the ‘good,’ harmonious, and logically confirmatory consequences of religious concepts as such” with the 
“good and pleasant consequences which come from believing these concepts,” where Pratt argues that “[i]t is one 
thing to say a belief is true because the logical consequences that flow from it fit in harmoniously with our otherwise 
grounded knowledge; and quite another to call it true because it is pleasant to believe.” On the reading of James 
offered here, James can agree with Pratt’s distinction, and opt for the same side.  
27
 For a flavour of the sort of coherentist view I have in mind, cf. Blanshard, vol. 2, 227: “What really tests [a] 
judgement is the extent of our accepted world that is implicated with it and would be carried down with it if it fell.” 
One difference between this approach and Willaschek’s, is that for the coherentist this test does provide a form of 
evidence in favor of a belief, whereas Willascheck does not seem to see evidence in this way; for example, while 
recognizing that to come to believe that “I am a brain in a vat” would lead me to give up so many of my other beliefs 
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James then goes on to draw his well-know distinction between “hard” and “soft” 
determinism, where he rejects the latter as a “quagmire of evasion” (WWJ 6:117), so that the 
choice for him comes down to hard determinism and indeterminism, where he reminds us that 
“evidence of an external kind to decide between determinism and indeterminism is, as I intimated 
a while back, strictly impossible to find” (WWJ 6:117). He characterizes the difference between 
the two positions as follows: 
 
[Determinism] professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely appoint and 
decree what the other parts shall be…Indeterminism, on the contrary, says that the parts have a 
certain amount of loose play on one another, so that the laying down of one of them does not 
necessarily determine what the others shall be. Indeterminism thus allows for real possibilities, 
while determinism does not. (WWJ 6:117-8) 
 
James also insists that (in the terms of “The Will to Believe”) the issue between them is “forced”: 
  
The issue, it will be seen, is a perfectly sharp one, which no eulogistic terminology can smear over 
or wipe out [cf. ‘soft determinism’]. The truth must lie with one side or the other, and its lying 
with one side makes the other false. (WWJ 6:118) 
 
And he also emphasizes that the empirical sciences cannot settle this dispute one way or the 
other: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
as to reduce me to insanity, he still thinks the belief lacks any evidential basis – which is precisely what the 
coherentist would deny. See Willascheck 2010, 196. For further discussion of coherentism in this form, see Stern 
2004. 
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Now, can science be called in to tell us which of these two point-blank contradicters of each other 
is right? Science professes to draw no conclusions but such as are based on matters of fact, things 
that have actually happened; but how can any amount of assurance that something actually 
happened give us the least grain of information as to whether another thing might or might not 
have happened in its place? Only facts can be proved by other facts. With things that are 
possibilities and not facts, facts have no concern. If we have no other evidence than the evidence 
of existing facts, the possibility-question must remain a mystery never to be cleared up. (WWJ 
6:119) 
 
Ultimately, James argues, what should and will push us one way or the other will be broader 
considerations concerning which view makes the world a more rationally ordered place: 
 
What divides us into possibility and anti-possibility men is different faiths or postulates – 
postulates of rationality. To this man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it – to that 
man more rational with possibilities excluded; and talk as we will about having to yield to 
evidence, what makes us monists or pluralists, determinists or indeterminists, is at bottom always 
some sentiment like this. (WWJ 6:119) 
 
James argues that what makes the indeterminist position look rationally problematic is a concern 
about chance, which people can think introduces an element of chaos into our picture of the 
world that will reduce it to a muddled and incoherent heap: 
 
[M]any persons talk as if the minutest dose of disconnectedness of one part with another, the 
smallest modicum of independence, the faintest tremor of ambiguity about the future, for example, 
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would ruin everything, and turn this godly universe into a sort of insane sand-heap or nulliverse, 
no universe at all. (WWJ 6:121) 
 
James argues against this view, holding that chance can be admitted without any such direful 
consequences – so he doesn’t take there to be any rational grounds to rule it out, in coherentist 
terms. Nonetheless, he allows that while this may undercut an important argument against 
indeterminism, it doesn’t yet give us any argument in support of it: 
 
But although, in discussing the word ‘chance’ I may at moments have seemed to be arguing for its 
real existence, I have not meant to do so yet. We have not ascertained whether this be a world of 
chance or no; at most, we have agreed that it seems so. And I now repeat what I have said at the 
outset, that, from any strict theoretical point of view, the question is insoluble. (WWJ 6:124) 
 
Thus, “after all our tedious clearing of the way,” James moves to his non-theoretical argument for 
indeterminism and the reality of chance. 
He begins by emphasizing the importance to us of the notion of judgments of regret, or 
the “wish that something might be otherwise” (WWJ 6:124), such as “acts of wanton cruelty or 
treachery, for example, whether performed by others or by ourselves” (WWJ 6:125), where 
James gives as an example a particularly callous murder that took place at Brockton, saying of it:  
“We feel that, although a perfect mechanical fit to the rest of the universe, it is a bad moral fit, 
and that something else would really have been better in its place” (WWJ 6:125). 
James then claims that the determinist cannot make sense of this feeling of regret: 
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But for the deterministic philosophy the murder, the sentence, and the prisoner’s optimism were 
all necessary from eternity; and nothing else for a moment had a ghost of a chance of being put in 
their place. To admit such a chance, the determinists tell us, would be to make a suicide of reason; 
so we must steel our hearts against the thought. (WWJ 6:125) 
 
The consequence of this outlook, James argues, is that the determinist must be committed to a 
pessimistic view of the universe as a whole: for while they cannot intelligibly regret any 
particular event (as this could not have been otherwise), they can only feel regret for the “whole 
frame of things of which the murder is one member”: “I can see no escape whatever from this 
pessimistic conclusion if, being determinists, our judgment of regret is to be allowed to stand at 
all” (WWJ 6:126). 
James then considers various ways in which the determinist might try to allay this 
pessimism by extinguishing all judgments of regret – for example, by adopting a Panglossian 
optimism, or a form of gnostic subjectivism which sees value in what we are taught by the 
experience of the bad; but James rejects all such options as jeopardizing too much in our system 
of beliefs: 
 
We have thus clearly revealed to our view what may be called the dilemma of determinism, so far 
as determinism pretends to think things out at all. A merely mechanical determinism, it is true, 
rather rejoices in not thinking them out. It is very sure that the universe must satisfy its postulate 
of a physical continuity and coherence, but smiles at anyone who comes forward with a postulate 
of moral coherence as well. (WWJ 6:128-9) 
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James’s ultimate defense of his indeterministic approach, therefore, turns on his claim that only 
this is consistent with our feelings of regret, so that on this basis a rejection of determinism is 
legitimate: 
 
But this brings us right back, after such a long detour, to the question of indeterminism and to the 
conclusion of all I came here to say tonight. For the only consistent way of representing a 
pluralism and a world whose parts may affect one another through their conduct being either good 
or bad is the indeterministic way. What interest, zest, or excitement can there be in achieving the 
right way, unless we are enabled to feel that the wrong way is also a possible and a natural way – 
nay, more, a menacing and immanent way? And what sense can there be in condemning ourselves 
for taking the wrong way, unless we need have done nothing of the sort, unless the right way was 
open to us as well? I cannot understand the willingness to act, no matter how we feel, without the 
belief that acts are really good and bad. I cannot understand the belief that an act is bad, without 
regret at its happening. I cannot understand regret without the admission of real, genuine 
possibilities in the world. Only then is it other than a mockery to feel, after we have failed to do 
our best, than an irreparable opportunity is gone from the universe, the loss of which it must 
forever mourn. 
 If you insist that this is all superstition, that possibility is in the eye of science and reason 
impossibility, and that if I act badly ‘tis that the universe was foredoomed to suffer this defect, you 
fall right back into the dilemma, the labyrinth, of pessimism and subjectivism, from out of whose 
toils we have just found our way. (WWJ 6:135) 
 
As James notes, nothing in this argument proves that we have free will, where he reminds us that 
“I expressly repudiated awhile ago the pretension to offer any arguments which could be coercive 
in a so-called scientific fashion in this matter” (WWJ 6:135).  
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Nonetheless, he clearly holds that his argument from regret is sufficient to make his 
indeterministic position a plausible one, with greater support than the deterministic alternative – 
thus adopting what is still an evidentialist strategy based on practical grounds,
28
 much like 
Kant’s. 
 
4. Pragmatism and Idealism on Freedom: A Step too Far? 
I have argued, then, that contrary to various prominent readings of both Kant and James 
respectively, there is reason to see a convergence between their two positions concerning free 
will, but not around some form of non-evidentialism, but rather around a form of evidentialism 
which nonetheless give priority to practical reason in a real sense. In this last section, I want to 
look at some challenges to my position here, where these can be brought out by considering an 
argument that there are some weaknesses to James’s position that do not apply to Kant’s, thereby 
suggesting that the two are not to be equated after all. 
 One potential difficulty with James’s argument as I have presented it, it could be said, is 
that it hinges on regret, and the claim that this “moral belief” only makes sense if things could 
have been otherwise. A first worry might be to deny that regret actually does require this 
possibility: might I not intelligibly regret the fact that at some point I will die, for example, while 
(regretfully) recognizing that this cannot be otherwise? However, in response to this it can be said 
that James here is focusing on something more like “agent regret”,29 i.e. regret for things that are 
                                                        
28
 Cf. James’s summary of this part of “The Dilemma of Determinism” which is included in the contents page of the 
collection in which it appears: “A world with chance in it is morally the less irrational alternative” (WWJ 6:11). Cf. 
WWJ 6:137, where James denies that accepting the reality of chance involves “the suicide of reason.” Cf. also his 
comment in a letter to Renouvier: “I believe more and more that free will, if accepted at all, must be accepted as a 
postulate in justification of our moral judgment that certain things already done might have been better done. This 
implies that something different was possible in their place” (CWJ, 5:260). 
29
 This terminological originates with Bernard Williams’s essay, “Moral Luck”: See [1976] 1982, 27. But Williams 
uses it to cover regret by the agent for actions they have performed themselves, while I am using it to cover regret for 
things done by agents in general, but not necessarily by oneself. 
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seemingly tied to the work of individuals (such as the Brockton murder with which James starts), 
where this would not apply to my own mortality (hopefully). 
 However, a second and rather deeper worry might be pressed at this point: namely that it 
seems conceivable on James’s approach that we could come to give up regrets of this sort, even 
though we might find it difficult to do, given the conceptual interconnections that James traces 
between this belief and many others. But still, difficulty is not impossibility, and “one man’s 
modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens,” so James’s can’t really claim to have shown that 
we might not find ourselves rationally obliged to switch sides on this matter, and so become 
determinists. In fact, this seems to be an implication of his approach that James is prepared to 
concede (cf. WWJ 6:135-6). 
 It is then debatable, of course, how much damage this causes to the Jamesian strategy as I 
have outlined it. One might take the line (which is James’s own) that no greater certainty is 
possible on such matters, and that at the end of the day an individual can only take up the position 
which seems correct to him or her given their personal starting points and convictions; indeed, as 
we have mentioned previously, given that this matter concerns our freedom, James thinks it could 
not be otherwise, as something more conclusive would take that very freedom away (cf. again 
WWJ 6:135-6). 
 It might be useful to very briefly compare James’s position as I understand it here to 
Strawson’s in his famous essay on “Freedom and Resentment.” Like James, Strawson points to 
an attitude which we have to each other, namely resentment, and then brings out the close 
connection between the intelligibility of this attitude and the attribution to others of free will. 
Strawson then considers the question whether this is decisive, or whether the argument could be 
reversed, so that one might argue from determinism to the need to drop our reactive attitudes, 
such that we would then treat everyone as we currently treat those who we deem to lack 
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responsibility for their actions. Strawson’s response is to allow that this could happen in some 
sense; but he emphasizes the great difficulty we would have in doing so given the framework of 
beliefs, attitudes and commitments which we currently have, in such a way as to render this 
possibility an essentially empty one from where we stand: “This commitment is part of the 
general framework of human life, not something that can come up for review as particular cases 
can come up for review within this general framework” (P.T. Strawson 1982, 70). Strawson’s 
approach would also broadly seem to be a coherentist one, along lines rather similar to those I 
have outlined for James, where both therefore seem to accept that as a result, the grounds on 
which they support our belief in freedom does not leave that belief wholly invulnerable on the 
one hand,
30
 while they think any challenge to it is highly resistible on the other, given where we 
currently stand.
31
 
 However, it might now be argued that this way of putting things brings out an important 
difference between Kant on the one hand, and James and Strawson on the other, where this 
difference gives Kant another (and perhaps better) way of handling the problem we have been 
discussing. 
 Essentially, this difference may be said to arise because on my account at least, James 
(and Strawson) still give too great a place to theoretical reasoning in this dispute, by seeing the 
link between regret (or resentment) and freedom in evidential terms, where this means the 
                                                        
30
 Cf. P.F. Strawson 1982, 68: “And our question reduces to this: could, or should, the acceptance of the determinist 
thesis lead us always to look on everyone exclusively this way [i.e. the way we currently look on those who we deem 
incapable of free will and thus as inappropriate targets for reactive attitudes like resentment]? For this is the only 
condition worth considering under which acceptance of determinism could lead to the decay or repudiation of 
participant reactive attitudes/It does not seem self-contradictory that this might happen. So I suppose we must say 
that it is not absolutely inconceivable that it should happen.” 
31
 So the passage above continues: “But I am strongly inclined to think that it is, for us as we are, practically 
inconceivable. The human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal relationships is, I think, too 
thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so 
change our world that, in it, there were no longer any such thing as inter-personal relationships as we normally 
understand them; and being involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them precisely is 
being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question.” 
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reversal in the direction of argument still remains for them as a possibility (however remote and 
unlikely they think it is that we would ever commit ourselves to that reversal), by using the truth 
of determinism to cast doubt on our feelings of regret or attitudes of resentment. It could be said, 
however, that in Kant’s case the position is very different, because for him “the priority of 
practical reason” precisely means that our beliefs are impervious to anything theoretical reason 
can offer as grounds for change, so that the possibilities for belief revision which James and 
Strawson seem to allow are closed off to us in this manner. 
 To see how this might be so, it is useful to move back from the Critique of Practical 
Reason, and to consider the Groundwork, and an influential account of the so-called “prefatory 
argument” given in the second sub-section of part III of that work which has been offered by 
Korsgaard and others. The key claim in this argument is generally taken to be that “every being 
that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is actually free, in a practical respect, 
precisely because of that” (KGS 4:448). On Korsgaard’s reading, Kant is arguing here that the 
truth of determinism can make no difference to our deliberations as practical agents, because we 
must still proceed as if we are free when it comes to making our decisions, so that practical 
reason has priority over theoretical reason in this more radical sense: 
 
The point is not that you must believe you are free, but that you must choose as if you were free. It 
is important to see that this is quite consistent with believing yourself to be fully determined. To 
make it vivid, imagine that you are participating in a scientific experiment, and you know that 
today your every move is programmed by an electronic device implanted in your brain… [But] In 
order to do anything, you must simply ignore the fact that you are programmed, and decide what 
to do – just as if you were free. You will believe that your decision is a sham, but it makes no 
difference. Kant’s point, then, is not about the theoretical assumption necessary to decision, but 
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about a fundamental feature of the standpoint from which decisions are made. It follows from this 
feature that we must regard our decisions as springing ultimately from principles that we have 
chosen, and justifiable by those principles. We must regard ourselves as having free will. 
(Korsgaard 1996b, 162-3)
32
 
 
On this account of Kant’s position, then, practical reason is concerned with determining the will 
to action, and as such it is entitled to ignore what theoretical reason tells us, even if the latter tells 
us that in fact a necessary condition for such action does not hold. If a position of this sort could 
be made cogent, it might seem to put freedom in a less assailable position for Kant than for James 
and Strawson, and show that his approach to this issue is ultimately distinct from theirs. 
There are, however, important difficulties in reading Kant this way, both interpretatively 
and philosophically. 
First, it would leave it hard to see how Kant could be committed to the unity of reason, as 
it would appear to leave theoretical and practical reason at odds with one another. Second, Kant 
himself seems more worried by the challenge of theoretical reason than this approach would 
suggest. So, for example, Kant writes in the Groundwork that “[I]f even the thought of freedom 
contradicts itself, or nature, which is equally necessary, it would have to be given up altogether in 
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 Henry Allison (2012, 92) also presents the argument in similar terms: “But while Kant does not preclude such a 
state of affairs [that our belief in freedom is illusory] on theoretical grounds, he does deny the practical possibility of 
accepting any such thesis on the grounds that it is not a thought on which one can deliberate or act. To take oneself 
as a rational agent is to assume that one’s reason has a practical application or, equivalently, that one has a will. 
Moreover, one cannot assume this without already presupposing the idea of freedom, which is why one can act, or 
take oneself to act, only under this idea. It constitutes, as it were, the form of thought of oneself as a rational agent.” 
Cf. also Wood 2008, 130-2, and Darwall 2013, 222: “[In Groundwork III Kant] goes on to argue that an assumption 
of autonomy is essential to the deliberative standpoint and that assuming autonomy commits one to the Categorical 
Imperative and thus to morality. If that is so, then autonomy and morality really hold, or at least, any rational agent 
must assume they hold when deliberating about what to do.” Darwall thinks this strategy is more promising than the 
one pursued in the second Critique, for reasons outlined above: “It is only through taking ourselves to be morally 
obligated that we are forced to conclude that we can act for a reason that is independent of any property of the 
objects of our desire… But this leaves open the possibility that both morality and autonomy are mere figments. Even 
if morality and autonomy are a stable reciprocal pair, with each entailing the other, both may be illusions 
nonetheless” (Darwall 2013, 223).  
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favor of natural necessity” (KGS 4:456). As Sergio Tenenbaum has observed: “This is very far 
from the claim that we can act under the idea of freedom independently of what we actually 
believe about freedom and determinism” (Tenenbaum 2012, 559). Thirdly, it might be asked, 
how does proving that we must assume we are free, or act as if we were free, or regard ourselves 
as free, even though we have grounds to think we are not, help settle our worries on this issue?
33
 
In fact, might it not seem to make them worse, as we now seem to have to assume, etc things 
about ourselves when we come to act that we otherwise know to be false? And isn’t this the worst 
kind of skeptical nightmare, locking us into views of ourselves that we cannot escape even when 
they are in error?
34
 One response might be that this doesn’t actually matter so much, as what is in 
question here is not a belief that might be false, but some other kind of attitude;
35
 but nonetheless, 
it could be replied, unless we are free that attitude would seem misplaced. Finally, given the 
claim it makes about our freedom, this would seem to leave a gap in the rest of Kant’s argument 
in the Groundwork, at least as this is understood on this approach, which is meant to go as 
follows:
36
 
 
1. A rational will must be regarded as a free will 
2. A free will is a will under moral law 
3. Therefore, a rational will is a will under moral law 
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 Karl Ameriks (2003, esp. 247-8) presses this point strongly, where he uses these problems to argue that they led 
Kant to change his approach in the second Critique. 
34
 Cf. Robert Stern 2000, 85-6. Cf. also G. Strawson, 2010, 64: “The idea that a certain view may be inescapable and 
therefore somehow permissible or even correct, despite the fact that we are able to get into a position in which we 
can see it to be false – or so we think – is very problematic. Surely ‘irresistibility does not entail truth’ – even 
species-wide irresistibility?” 
35
 Cf. Darwall 2013, 229: “The idea need not be that one must believe that one is free in these respects or that one 
must disbelieve hard determinism. The point is that deliberation is intelligible only on these assumptions.” Cf. also 
the quote given from Korsgaard above: “The point is not that you must believe that you are free….” 
36
 See Korsgaard 1996a, 24. 
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For this argument to work, it would seem that (1) requires the rational will to be free, where 
“must be regarded as” doesn’t look like it is strong enough to render the argument valid – unless 
the conclusion is also modified to the correspondingly weak claim that “a rational will is a will 
that must regard itself as under a moral law,” which itself doesn’t look strong enough to dispel 
the threat that morality is in fact a chimera, whatever we may be compelled to think about it. 
But if the preparatory argument is not an argument for our freedom of this sort, what is its 
role in the Groundwork? My claim is that what Kant is trying to establish here is not that we are 
free, but that the moral law applies to all rational beings, where this is a class that is obviously 
much wider than the merely human. The concern is therefore whether someone could hold that 
there might be rational beings who could be said not to stand under the moral law – where if so, 
Kant’s basic commitment to the universality of that law (which he thinks we all share) would be 
put in jeopardy. This is a fundamental preoccupation of Kant’s, and one that he frequently claims 
in the Groundwork and elsewhere that he is in a better position to deal with than other moral 
theorists – and hence it needs to be resolved.37 
Kant’s way out of this problem is to argue that we do not have to establish that a rational 
being really is free for the moral law to apply to them, as it is sufficient that they have to think 
they are free, where every rational agent (i.e. every rational being endowed with a will) must 
think that of themselves: 
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 See for example: KGS 4:389: “the command: thou shalt not lie, does not just hold for human beings only, as if 
other rational beings did not have to heed it; and so with all remaining actual moral laws…”; KGS 4:412: “…moral 
laws are to hold for every rational being as such”; KGS 4:426: “The question is therefore this: is it a necessary law 
for all rational beings always to appraise their actions in accordance with such maxims as they themselves could will 
to serve as universal laws?”; KGS 4:430-1: “This principle of humanity…is not borrowed from experience…because 
of its universality, since it applies to all rational beings as such and no experience is sufficient to determine anything 
about them;…” I have also argued that this issue plays a central role in Kant’s account of the Formula of Humanity 
in section II of the Groundwork: see Stern 2013, 22-40.   
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Now I say: every being that cannot act otherwise than under the idea of freedom is actually free, in 
a practical respect, precisely because of that; i.e. all laws that are inseparably bound up with 
freedom hold for it just as if its will had also been declared free in itself, and in a way that is valid 
in theoretical philosophy…. For even if this latter [theoretical] point is left unsettled, the same 
laws that would bind a being that was actually free yet hold for a being that cannot act otherwise 
than under the idea of its own freedom. Here we can thus liberate ourselves from the burden that 
weighs upon theory. (4:448 and note) 
 
So, Kant thinks, the reciprocity thesis can be extended to cover not only beings that are shown to 
be free on theoretical grounds (grounds that we would find it very hard to supply given our 
limitations and lack of knowledge concerning such beings), but also to beings that must think that 
they are free, which includes all rational beings which have a will, and so the universality of the 
moral law is secured – as of course the moral law would not be expected to apply to rational 
beings without such a will. How is it that we can extend the reciprocity thesis in this way? I think 
the answer is that a rational being with a will must take itself to be free, and even if a being 
merely takes itself to be free, then it must take itself to be under the moral law, where this is 
sufficient to show that it can’t repudiate the law, because (given Kant’s earlier arguments for the 
reciprocity thesis) there is no other way this rational being can see its actions as being guided – so 
it is impossible for any rational agent to be a refusnik when it comes to the moral law, without at 
the same time repudiating its claim to agency. The universality problem has thus been solved.  
It can be argued, therefore, that the Groundwork’s preparatory argument does not provide 
an argument for our freedom, and thus a strategy that is somehow different and more radical than 
the one that we have attributed to Kant in the second Critique. If this is right, therefore, we are 
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entitled to continue to read Kant’s approach to the “primacy of practical reason” concerning 
freedom as operating along the same evidentialist lines that we also attributed to James. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have therefore seen that when it comes to the problem of free will, that notwithstanding 
certain differences, James and Kant can be viewed as adopting broadly similar strategies – where 
that similarity suggests that when it comes to this question, at least, James chose not to merely go 
round Kant, but through him, while taking an route that can be understood more evidentially than 
has generally been supposed.
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